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Financial transparency in Britain’s secrecy jurisdictions has just got a whole lot murkier 
following the UK’s decision to leave the EU. 
The purpose of this commentary is to promote a general discussion concerning the effect of 
Brexit,1 on the ability of the UK to regulate financial crime in its Overseas Territories and 
Crown Dependencies which operate as financial secrecy havens.  
On the 23 June 2016, more than 30 million voters (71.8%) took to the polls to decide 
whether the (United Kingdom) UK should leave or remain in the European Union (EU). A 
majority vote of 52% to 48% opted to leave the EU.2 The upshot of such a decision is that 
the status of UK legislation which has been enacted to comply with the implementation of 
EU Directives now faces an uncertain future. The EU’s Fourth Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive was approved by the European Parliament on 20 May 2015 and came into force on 
26 June 2015.3 The Fourth Directive is one such piece of legislation that – pre-Brexit – was to 
be fully integrated into UK domestic anti-money laundering policy, but now forms part of a 
raft of EU legislation which may potentially be scrapped by the Government upon 
completion of the UK’s exit negotiations in 2018.  
One year ago, it seemed probable that the UK would remain for the foreseeable future 
within the EU. As a Member State, the UK was required by the Fourth Directive to update its 
relevant anti-money laundering policies and to implement the new requirements into 
updated national statutes by 26 June 2017 – these being revamped versions of the Money 
Laundering Regulations 2007 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Certainly, in 2015 the 
Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, which drafts UK legislation, would have been busy 
preparing to amend existing anti-money laundering legislation to comply with the Fourth 
Directive. However, post-Brexit it is highly likely that the Government will review the body 
of laws which stem from EU Directives and therefore the Fourth Directive will also be 
scrutinised, leaving the degree of influence that it has on UK money laundering policy, open 
to debate.  
Currently and until Britain’s exit negotiations are complete, EU Directives are enforceable 
and legally binding on the UK and its entire territory – including any of the Overseas 
Territories, or self-governing (non-EU) Crown Dependencies that wish the treaty to apply to 
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them.4 This means that the UK and its relevant territories are bound by the Fourth Directive 
until Parliament decides otherwise following the official exit from the EU. However, it may 
be proposed that leaving the EU was part of an agenda by the UK Government to avoid 
compliance with increasingly stringent financial regulations – regulations which would affect 
the existing opacity of the financial secrecy havens which are Britain’s Overseas Territories, 
encompassing some of the richest countries in the world, including Bermuda, the Cayman 
Islands and other notable secrecy jurisdictions such as Turks and Caicos Islands and the 
British Virgin Islands.5  
The EU joined the global fight against money laundering in 1991. Twenty five years ago, 
financial secrecy was not making the headlines as it is today and the main preoccupations of 
the anti-money laundering laws coming out of the EU were to ensure compliance of its 
Member States with the international legal framework in order to combat the proceeds of 
drug trafficking. Indeed, the objectives of the Member States in adopting the First Directive 
on Money Laundering,6 were pertinently highlighted by the accompanying statement of 
intention submitted to the Council on 26 June 1991. 7 The statement was evidence that 
Governments of Member States were uniting as a collective to ‘undertake to take all 
necessary steps…to enact criminal legislation enabling them to comply with their 
obligations’ under the 1988 United Nations Convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs 
and psychotropic substances,8 and the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on laundering, 
tracing, seizure and confiscation of proceeds of crime.9 Under the First Directive, Member 
States were required to prohibit money laundering and to oblige the financial sector, 
comprising credit institutions and a wide range of other financial institutions, to identify 
their customers, keep appropriate records, establish internal procedures to train staff and 
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guard against money laundering and to report any indications of money laundering to the 
competent authorities.10 
The Second Directive11 which was adopted on 4 December 2001, was concerned with a 
widening of the predicate offences and importantly, the legislation acknowledged that 
organised crime is linked closely to money laundering. Such an acknowledgement, meant 
the restrictive measures of the First Directive now had a wider scope of application as they 
no longer applied only to drug related money laundering offences. The objective of the 
Third Directive,12 adopted by Member States on 26 October 2005, was to align the money 
laundering regulatory regimes of European governments with the FATF Recommendations 
applicable to tackling money laundering and terrorist financing.13 In response to the Third 
Directive, the UK repealed and replaced the Money Laundering Regulations 2003 with the 
2007 Regulations.14  
It is evident that each mutation of the EU Money Laundering Directive is generated by the 
initial gut response of the Commission to the current state of affairs concerning money 
laundering issues at the given time. Ergo, in the early nineties, the focus of ‘going after the 
money’ was the war on drugs – a disastrous movement popularised by Nixonian US policy 
making in the 1970s and adopted by other Western countries. Following the terrorist 
attacks on the US on 11 September 2001, the noughties global anti-money laundering 
policies reflected a focal shift away from drugs to combating the financing of terrorism. In 
2015 the Fourth Directive was ushered in to reflect a different concern of EU policy makers, 
one which centres on an increased need for financial transparency in light of the HSBC and 
Panama Papers scandals. In the Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the reasons for revising the Third Directive include the need to strengthen the 
Internal Market, ‘safeguard the interests of society from criminality and terrorist acts, and 
contribute to the financial stability of the EU by means of protecting the soundness, proper 
functioning and integrity of the financial system’.15  
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Importantly, the Fourth Directive requires Member States to ensure, ‘that corporate and 
other legal entities incorporated in their territory obtain and hold accurate and current 
information on their beneficial ownership’ and ‘that the information is held in a central 
register in each member state or in a public central register’.16 Information on the beneficial 
owner includes their names, month and year of birth, nationality, residency and ownership 
details. A wide range of applicants will be able to access the registers including competent 
authorities which encompasses financial intelligence units (unrestricted access), obliged 
entities such as banks conducting customer due diligence checks. Controversially, members 
of the public or organisations with legitimate interests, such as investigative journalists and 
other concerned citizens, can also access the central registers.17 For this reason, the Fourth 
Directive, in its preamble (paragraph 15) states that, ‘Member States should be able, under 
national law, to allow for access that is wider than the access provided for under this 
Directive.’ However, following the aforementioned requirements of the Fourth Directive, it 
is extremely worrying to note that a 2015 briefing by the All Party Parliamentary Group 
(APPG) on Anti-Corruption, states that, ‘there is a concern that come transposition, the 
definition of ‘legitimate interest’ will be purposefully narrowed by member states to exclude 
concerned citizens’.18  Simply put, it seems that some Overseas Territories simply refuse to 
engage with the concept of a public register, as evidenced by the APPG’s statement that 
‘Bermuda refused to consult and ruled out introducing a register altogether’.19 
In 2015, after the Fourth Directive was adopted, the European Commission continued its 
mission to water down financial secrecy when it published a tax haven blacklist. 20 A list of 
the world’s thirty worst offending tax havens that includes UK the overseas territories of 
Bermuda and the Cayman Islands. Each country on the list has been blacklisted by the EU 
and to be so, it had to be nominated by at least 10 EU Member States. The UK did not make 
any suggestions. It is important at this juncture, to note that the same harmful secrecy laws 
which enable tax evasion, are also conducive to laundering the proceeds of crime and 
creating a criminogenic environment in which financial crime thrives. The very same secrecy 
laws, it could be argued, uphold the economy in small islands states which are UK Overseas 
Territories or Crown Dependencies; a very good reason for some of the most significant 
Brexit backers to advocate for the UK to leave the EU.  
It can be no coincidence that those who were driving the Brexit campaign are also those 
who would have the most to lose if the UK increased financial transparency in line with the 
Fourth Directive, to combat tax frauds and financial crimes. Specifically, high profile voters 
who signed the Brexit support letter include offshore-tax planners working for the super-
rich and the heads of dormant businesses. According to Rob Davies of the Guardian, the 
signatures on the letter include: Former CEO of HSBC, Michael Geoghegan; Robert Hilcox of 
Hilcox Insurance and ardent supporter of tax avoidance who also uses Bermuda as a tax 
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haven; Martin Bellamy CEO of Salamanca Group who advises the mega wealthy on offshore 
trust formation and foreign investment opportunities; and Clive Thorne of Wedlake Bell who 
Davies describes as a magician of ‘imaginative tax planning for onshore and offshore’ 
business.21 
On the 5 July 2016, the European Commission further underlined its commitment to 
cracking down on tax havens by adopting a proposal to bolster existing EU rules on anti-
money laundering to counter terrorist financing and increase transparency about who really 
owns trusts and companies. There is no hiding the fact that the Commission’s proposal was 
prompted by the recent terrorist attacks in the EU and the Panama Papers scandal and that 
the new proposals were drafted to recognise the need for increased and strengthened 
efforts to combat money laundering in offshore financial centres operating as secrecy 
havens. Indeed, on the same day the Commission released the proposals, Věra Jourová, the 
EU's Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality said: 
"Today, we are putting forward stricter transparency rules to cut terrorist financing 
and step up our fight against money laundering and tax avoidance. The update of the 
Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive will prevent any loopholes in Europe for 
terrorists, criminals or anyone trying to play with taxation rules to finance their 
activities."22   
Also on 5 July and parallel to the proposal to amend the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive, the Commission presented a Communication to the European Parliament setting 
out priorities for its work towards fairer, more transparent and more effective taxation.23 
The Communication, pushes for increased financial transparency and recognises that, ‘while 
some complex transactions and corporate structures may have entirely legitimate purposes, 
other offshore activities may be less justifiable or even illegal.’ The Communication also 
indicates that: 
‘there appears to be a strong case for introducing further measures – either through 
horizontal or sectorial provisions which specifically focus on those who promote or 
enable tax evasion and avoidance schemes. This would help competent authorities 
to identify and block such activity at an early stage and to address loopholes in 
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legislation allowing for it. It would also have a dissuasive effect on those who actively 
encourage and use aggressive tax planning’.24 
The adoption by the UK of the EU’s strengthened measures to combat money laundering 
could have a substantial impact on the opaque surroundings of Britain’s secrecy havens; 
effectively watering down financial secrecy so that jurisdictions like the Caymans and Jersey 
are unable to operate as they currently do. Therefore, leaving the EU would create a cordon 
sanitaire whereby nobody questions the financial secrecy structures of Britain’s offshore 
territories, simply because the UK will exist outside of the EU anti-money laundering 
framework and will no longer be answerable to the Commission.  
The Brexit process will take a number of years and while the Council of Europe is pushing for 
greater financial regulation and increased transparency, company service providers 
registered in the UK and its Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories, in particular, the 
British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands are among the worst offenders for enabling 
secrecy company ownership. A pessimist would see here only the kind of opportunities for 
obfuscation that have, to date, rendered the global anti-money laundering regime largely 
ineffective.25 
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